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PRODUCT LIABILITY
C.A. Assoc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 918 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Bratton, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, C.A. Associates ("Associates"), appealed a special jury ver-
dict in favor of defendant, Dow Chemical Company ("Dow"). The jury
found that mortar mixed with Sarabond, a Dow product, caused no
more masonry cracking than conventional mortar in buildings. Conse-
quently, Dow made no misrepresentations to Associates concerning
Sarabond. Associates argued that the district court abused its discretion
in excluding evidence of Sarabond-related failures in other structures.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court
held that the district court acted within its discretion in precluding the
evidence. The district court was concerned that the number of buildings
Associates wished to refer to would confuse the jury and cause delay and
prejudice. Although the court found that the evidence of similar acci-
dents may be relevant, Associates' experts were able to offer extensive
evidence concerning other buildings. This allowed Associates to rebut
the defenses raised by Dow without violating the district court's ruling.
Carter v. Unit Rig & Equip. Co., 908 F.2d 1483
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Carter, brought a product liability action against defend-
ants, Unit Rig & Equipment Company ("Unit Rig") and General Electric
("GE") for the wrongful death of her son, Terry. The jury found Unit
Rig liable for Terry's death and assessed damages of $366,667. GE, on
the other hand, settled with Carter for $20,000. Applying Colorado's
comparative fault statute, the jury found Unit Rig twelve-percent re-
sponsible and Terry eighty-eight percent responsible. After deducting
the $20,000 GE settlement from the total damages, the district court
entered judgment for Carter for $41,600. Carter subsequently ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court improperly instructed the jury to
consider Terry's contributory negligence when apportioning responsi-
bility for the accident. Carter asked that the construction of Colorado's
comparative fault statute be certified to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Finally, Carter claimed that the district court erred by refusing to give a
sudden emergency instruction to the jury. Unit Rig cross appealed, ar-
guing that the $20,000 GE settlement should have been deducted solely
from Unit Rig's assessed damages and not from the total damages.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's construction of Colo-
rado's comparative fault statute. While the statute rejects the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery, it re-
quires that the negligence of a product liability plaintiff be considered
and damage awards be reduced to the extent of the plaintiff's responsi-
bility for his own injuries. The court declined to certify this issue to the
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Supreme Court of Colorado, finding substantial support for this inter-
pretation of the statute. The court found, however, that the district
court committed reversible error in refusing to give the sudden emer-
gency jury instruction. The court reasoned that the district court deter-
mined a factual issue which should have been submitted to the jury.
Finally, the court reviewed decisions construing the 1977 Colorado
Contribution Act. The court concluded that the district court properly
reduced the $20,000 setoff from the entire judgment before making the
comparative negligence reduction. The judgment was reversed and the
case remanded for a new trial.
Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Plaintiff, Huffman, was awarded $475,000 in a product liability ac-
tion against defendant, Caterpillar Tractor Co. ("Caterpillar").
Huffman appealed a reduction in damages. Huffman argued that the
district court erred when it instructed the jury that under Colorado's
comparative fault statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-406, ordinary negli-
gence constitutes fault. In addition, Huffman asserted that the district
court's refusal to award expert witness fees "as costs" violated Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-33-102(4). Caterpillar cross-appealed, claiming that
Huffman failed to establish a prima facie case of strict product liability.
Caterpillar also claimed that the district court erred by excluding testi-
mony of the decedent's co-workers regarding his lack of competence to
operate the vehicle on which he was killed. Finally, Caterpillar argued
that the Tenth Circuit should overrule its previous decision that evi-
dence of subsequent remediation of a product defect is admissible in
strict liability actions.
After examining the language and legislative history of Colorado's
comparative fault statute, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the term
"fault" was intended to include ordinary negligence. Consequently, the
reduction in Huffman's damage award was appropriate. Second, since
federal law controls the assessment of costs in a diversity case, expert
witness fees may only be awarded "as costs" in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 1821 (b), unless authorized by express agreement or by another
federal statute. In addition, the court found that Huffman's evidence
was more than adequate to support the jury's determination that the
vehicle was unreasonably dangerous under the consumer expectation
test, that the defects caused the accident, and that the warnings accom-
panying the vehicle were inadequate. The court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of dece-
dent's co-workers and refused to overrule its prior decision that Rule




Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Dillon, brought suit against defendant, Fibreboard Corp.
("F.C."), contending her husband contracted lung cancer from asbestos
fibres emanating from defendant's product. The district court granted
summary judgment against Dillon, finding that she presented insuffi-
cient evidence of exposure to F.C.'s product. On appeal, Dillon's repre-
sentative contended that the district court placed an improper burden of
proof upon her.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that Dillon need
only prove that her husband had sufficient contact with identifiable
products manufactured by F.C. The court found that Dillon submitted
sufficient testimony to support a significant probability that F.C.'s prod-
ucts caused the cancer. The court explained that testimony placed Dil-
lon in repeated, regular, and direct physical contact for over twenty
years with F.C.'s asbestos products. Thus, Dillon proved a causative link
between her husband's disease and F.C.'s products. This was sufficient
to show there was a genuine issue for trial. Accordingly, summary judg-
ment was improper.
Dow Chem. Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Dow Chemical Corporation ("Dow"), brought suit against
defendant, Research Products Company ("Research"), for equitable
subrogation and codefendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Com-
pany ("Hartford"), for tortious interference with a prospective contrac-
tual relation. The district court found in favor of Dow, and both
Research and Hartford appealed, contending: (1) the statute of limita-
tions was improperly applied; (2) that a release or assignment was nec-
essary for subrogation; and (3) the district court erred in excluding
certain evidence and admitting other evidence without a limiting
instruction.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was improp-
erly based on the time the payment was made rather than the time the
underlying tort claim arose. Second, the court held that release or as-
signment is not necessary for asserting subrogation claims. Finally, ex-
clusion of two pieces of evidence was held to be abuse of discretion by
the district court. Evidence necessary for the jury to apportion the
amount of settlement to each defendant was improperly suppressed.
Moreover, a memorandum incorrectly characterized as remedial in na-
ture should not have been excluded under Rule 407. Accordingly, the
judgments were reversed.
Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 898 F.2d 1452
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiffs, the Kloepfers, initiated a product liability action after
1991]
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their son was killed while riding as a passenger in a Honda all-terrain
vehicle. The action was based on theories of negligence, strict liability,
false advertising, negligence and strict liability for failure to warn, and
violation of reporting requirements of the Consumer Products Safety
Commission Act. The Kloepfers appealed an adverse jury verdict, con-
tending that: (1) the district court erred in failing to respond to a ques-
tion from the jury; (2) the use of the special verdict form was improper;
(3) it was error to exclude certain evidence, including specific questions
to Cindy Kloepfer, and to admit post-accident riding activities of the
vehicle's owner and driver; (4) reversible error resulted from defense
counsel's gross misconduct; (5) the voir dire was improper.
The Tenth Circuit first held that the district court was not required
to give additional instructions to the jury regarding whether the term
"user" in an interrogatory referred to all users of all-terrain vehicles, or
to this specific driver. Second, the Kloepfers waived their right to chal-
lenge the special verdict form. The court reasoned that at trial they de-
clined the opportunity to submit their own verdict form. Third, the
evidentiary rulings complained of on appeal were proper. Fourth, the
defense counsel's conduct did not give rise to reversible error. Fifth,
since voir dire questions were not included in the record on appeal, the
adequacy of voir dire was not reviewable.
Riley v. Brown & Root Inc., 896 F.2d 474
Author: Judge Timbers, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Riley, appealed an order granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant, Rust Engineering Company ("Rust"), and denying
her request to certify a question of state law to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. The district court held that Riley's product liability action was
barred by a special statute of repose, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 109. This stat-
ute provides that no tort action to recover damages for deficiency in
design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction of an im-
provement to real property shall be brought more than ten years after
substantial completion of the improvement. On appeal, Riley argued
that: (1) the machine in question was not an improvement to real prop-
erty; and (2) even if the machine were an improvement to real property,
§ 109 is unconstitutional because it abrogates the right of action to re-
cover for injuries resulting in death.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's order, which granted
summary judgment in favor of Rust. Accordingly, the court remanded
for reconsideration in light of a change in state law. During pendency of
the appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court announced in Smith v. Westing-
house, 732 P.2d 466 (Okla. 1987), a test to determine when electrical
equipment constitutes improvement to real property. The court also
stated that the constitutionality of § 109 should not be decided if the
case could be resolved on the narrower question of the application of
§ 109. Accordingly, the court ruled that this question of state law
should be decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
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McHargue v. Stokes, 912 F.2d 394
Author: Judge Sam, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, McHargue, injured his hand in a plastic injection molding
machine. At trial, McHargue's expert witness minimized the credibility
of the machine's safety device, which complied with the American Na-
tional Standard Institute ("ANSI") guidelines. The expert stated that
ANSI guidelines were a minimum consensus standard. On cross exami-
nation, defendant, Stokes, asked the expert if Occupational Health and
Safety Act ("OSHA") recognized any national consensus standards
other than ANSI. McHargue asserted that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing this cross examination. McHargue appealed the
district court's denial of his motion for a new trial after the jury returned
a no cause of action verdict for Stokes.
The Tenth Circuit held that the error resulting from the cross ex-
amination was harmless. Although one cannot use OSHA standards to
provide a basis for liability, they can be referred to as guidelines for
determining standards of care. Stokes did not introduce OSHA stan-
dards either to prove that the machine met OSHA requirements, or to
establish a standard of care. Rather, Stokes referred to ANSI standards
merely to demonstrate that OSHA recognizes them generally, and that
no other standards existed for the machine in question. Furthermore,
Stokes discussed the standards only after McHargue placed the credibil-
ity of ANSI standards in issue.
Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 893 F.2d 1149
Author: Judge Henley, sitting by designation
During her pregnancy, plaintiff, Wilson, ingested Benedectin, a
drug manufactured by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated's
("Merrell Dow's") predecessor, Richardson-Merrell, Incorporated. Wil-
son alleged that the drug caused her son to be born missing one finger
on each hand. Wilson consequently brought suit against Merrell Dow
on theories of product liability, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of
express and implied warranty, strict liability, and negligence. The jury,
however, returned a general verdict in favor of Merrell Dow. Wilson
subsequently appealed, alleging the district court erred in: (1) failing to
give the jury a missing witness instruction; (2) allowing defense counsel
to tell the jury that the absent witness was equally available to the plain-
tiff; (3) admitting into evidence Merrell Dow's sales charts because they
were hearsay and they failed to take into account when the Benedectin
was consumed; and (4) failing to grant Wilson's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the district court properly denied Wilson's request to give the jury a
missing witness instruction. The court noted that the decision to not
give a missing witness instruction rests largely within the district court's
discretion. The court also based its decision on a four part test: (1) the
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party must have the power to produce the witness; (2) the witness must
not be one who would ordinarily be expected to be biased against the
party; (3) the witness's testimony must not be comparatively unimpor-
tant, or cumulative, or inferior to what is already utilized in trial; and
(4) the witness must not be equally available to testify for either side.
The court concluded that Wilson was unable to prove two of the four
requisite elements necessary to mandate a missing witness instruction.
Specifically, the expert witness's testimony was cumulative and had rela-
tively insignificant probative value, and the expert was equally available
to both parties. Second, it was permissible for the district court to allow
in closing argument a comment that the expert witness was equally avail-
able to both parties. Essentially, when an absent witness is available to
both parties, either party is open to the inference that the missing testi-
mony would have been adverse. Third, the court used an abuse of dis-
cretion standard to review the district court's decision to admit Merrell
Dow's sales charts. After examining the trial transcript and sales charts,
the court held that even though the charts were hearsay, they were
nonetheless a type reasonably relied upon by experts and, therefore, ad-
missible under Fed. R. Evid. 705. Moreover, the failure of the charts to
take into account when the Benedectin was consumed, rendered them
less valuable. This failure, however, affected the weight and not the ad-
missability of the charts. Also, Wilson's counsel had ample opportunity
to cross-examine the experts regarding the charts. This questioning
proved sufficient to bring to the jury's attention the inadequacy of the
charts. Finally, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to return a ver-
dict in Merrell Dow's favor. Merrell Dow presented sufficient expert tes-
timony to create a conflict in the evidence. Accordingly, when the
evidence is in conflict, the jury alone has the power to weigh the evi-
dence and assess the witnesses' credibility. Thus, it was within the dis-
trict court's discretion to deny Wilson's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
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